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Making Sense of Loan Aversion
Evidence from Wisconsin
Sara Goldrick-Rab
University of Wisconsin– Madison
Robert Kelchen
Seton Hall University
In 2012 total student loan debt in the United States reached an all-
time high of $966 billion, with one-third of that debt held by 15 million 
people under age 30 (Lee 2013). Student loans are now the primary 
means through which American families fi nance postsecondary educa-
tion. With the costs of attendance higher than ever, and grant aid often 
available only for the fi nancially needy or exceptionally talented, nearly 
two-thirds of all undergraduates receive at least some government-
backed credit to cover those costs. That credit is comparatively acces-
sible, requiring a lengthy application but no credit history, and students 
and families can borrow a sizable amount of money. Yet not all students 
and families borrow, even when declining to borrow means that they 
are hard-pressed to afford college, and there is little evidence to help 
account for that apparent aversion. Thus, while there is widespread con-
cern about the amount of borrowing and “overborrowing,” high rates 
of delinquency and default in some sectors of the market, and debate 
about whether the resulting debt-income ratio is appropriate, deepening 
our understanding of the initial borrowing decision itself remains an 
important task.
Since college attainment is tightly linked to families’ ability to pay 
for college (e.g., Bailey and Dynarski 2011), substantial inequalities 
arise from students’ need to borrow and their decisions about how to 
respond to that need. Two groups of students on opposite ends of the 
income spectrum often fi nd themselves able to avoid borrowing. The 
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fi rst group is exceptionally wealthy, possessing the fi nancial strength 
to cover college costs without credit, while the second group is excep-
tionally poor (and often quite talented), thus receiving suffi cient grant 
aid to cover costs without need for credit. Most students and families 
fall into the great grey middle in between. These people have demon-
strable fi nancial need (as calculated by formulaic federal needs analy-
sis), meaning that there is a gap between their available resources and 
the costs of college attendance. They are nearly always offered loans, 
but a sizable fraction decline to take them.1 This is especially common 
among students from lower-income families; national data suggest that 
as many as 45 percent of the neediest undergraduates do not take up 
loans, even though this leaves them short of the resources required to 
cover their costs of attendance (Cunningham and Santiago 2008).2
Declining loans that could help meet the costs of college atten-
dance is typically referred to as loan aversion and according to some 
economists constitutes bizarre behavior (Cadena and Keys 2013). But 
aversion is a frequently used but poorly understood term, since it is 
unclear whether these students are actually averse to loans (implying 
a belief about borrowing), have a lack of information about them, or 
are not offered them at all (The Institute for College Access and Suc-
cess [TICAS] 2007). In addition, since data on loan aversion typically 
come from student surveys, it is diffi cult to know whether stated atti-
tudes translate into action. Finally, there is little systematic information 
about demographic differences in loan aversion and to what they may 
be attributed.
This generally weak knowledge base means that it is unclear 
whether and what kind of intervention is required and/or appropriate to 
encourage borrowing among (some) students to increase their chances 
of degree completion. In addition, more research is needed to determine 
the processes underlying the decision to forgo student loans, and in par-
ticular whether that decision constitutes loan aversion.
With these challenges in mind, this chapter contributes to the study 
of loan aversion by drawing on a comprehensive set of information 
about a focal group of students: Pell Grant recipients. The relatively low 
graduation rate of Pell recipients is a national concern and the focus of 
numerous initiatives such as the “Reimagining Aid Design and Deliv-
ery” project funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Since 
the purchasing power of the Pell Grant is at its lowest point in history 
up15bhslatch10.indd   318 2/17/2015   9:40:39 AM
Making Sense of Loan Aversion: Evidence from Wisconsin   319
(covering just 30 percent of the costs of a public four-year university on 
average), even low-income students have to cover as much as $12,000 
of college costs on their own (Goldrick-Rab 2013). Why do some low-
income students accept loans to cover this need while others do not?
We begin by triangulating evidence from both surveys and admin-
istrative records to get a handle on how differences in the measurement 
of loan-taking decisions might affect conclusions. We next examine 
differences in those decisions among more than 600 fi rst- time under-
graduates receiving the Pell Grant across 10 of Wisconsin’s public uni-
versities. In particular, we attend to demographic variation suggested by 
prior literature, including disparities based on race/ethnicity, parental 
education, and immigrant status. We also consider the role played by 
the institutional contexts where students attend college by examining 
the associations between loan decisions and university characteristics. 
After replicating some key borrowing disparities noted in earlier stud-
ies, we test several explanations for these differences. Specifi cally, we 
consider the moderating effects on loan decisions according to families’ 
fi nancial resources; perceived returns to education; fi nancial knowl-
edge; attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions; work behaviors; and social 
capital. Finally, we examine the evidence regarding the association 
between loan taking and educational outcomes.
Overall, our fi ndings strongly suggest that the manner in which loan 
decisions are measured have serious implications about the prevalence 
and antecedents of so-called loan aversion. Some analyses indicate that 
the decision to decline loans may be a strategy undertaken by students 
with strong family commitments and those living in contexts where the 
use of credit for consumption is normalized. We conclude with a discus-
sion of future areas for research and intervention, noting that there are 
still many unknowns regarding the consequences of loan taking, both 
on average and for different groups of students. This chapter suggests 
that loan aversion may not be something to overcome, but that it may in 
fact benefi t some students, perhaps while hampering the college attain-
ment of others.
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TRENDS IN COLLEGE FINANCING AND LOAN TAKING
The United States has never had a free system of public higher 
education; instead, political goals of equitable opportunity are pur-
sued through a complex price-discounting strategy known as fi nancial 
aid. To induce students from low-income families to choose college, 
government, philanthropy, and educational institutions collaboratively 
frame college enrollment as an affordable decision for all qualifi ed stu-
dents. Families and students are encouraged to embrace the fi nancial 
aid system’s workings, norms, and values, which include the contention 
that higher education yields private and public returns, and individuals 
should therefore feel comfortable taking on debt to invest in their human 
capital development (Baum and Schwartz 2012; Leslie and Brinkman 
1987; Manski and Wise 1983; McPherson and Schapiro 1991). Institu-
tions of higher education are then left to determine the value of their 
services and set their own prices. The return to individual investments 
is expressed in terms of increased earnings observed at some time in the 
future, but it requires signifi cant near-term sacrifi ce (Carnevale, Rose, 
and Cheah 2011). Concomitantly, because of the social benefi ts accrued 
to an educated populace, the government asserts its authority to help 
ensure that low-income citizens can pursue higher education through 
vouchers (such as Pell Grants) and government-managed loan systems 
(Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance 2012).
The availability and use of federal loans has changed radically over 
time. Prior to the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, fed-
eral loans consisted almost entirely of subsidized loans targeting needy 
families. Total federal loan volume was around $22 billion (in 2011 
dollars) in 1991–1992. Over the course of the next year, that number 
grew by almost 50 percent with the introduction of unsubsidized loans, 
which at the time constituted 9 percent of all student loan dollars across 
all sources. The growth of unsubsidized loans was dramatic, swelling 
from about $10 billion (in 2011 dollars) in 1995–1996 to more than $20 
billion in 2005–2006, and to almost $50 billion in 2011–2012. Those 
increases correspond to real declines in family income associated with 
the recession and increasing college costs, including at public colleges 
and universities. Growth in subsidized loans was slower, since they are 
means-tested and less available (Baum and Payea 2012).
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Currently, dependent undergraduate students can borrow up to 
$5,500 in Stafford Loans (including a maximum of $3,500 in subsi-
dized loans) in their fi rst year of study, and up to $6,500 (including up to 
$4,500 in subsidized loans) in their second year. The limit for the third 
year and beyond is $7,500 (including up to $5,500 in subsidized loans). 
Average total borrowing per full-time equivalent undergraduate student 
rose by 45 percent, from $3,677 (in 2011 dollars) to $5,335 between 
2001–2002 and 2006–2007, and by another 4 percent to $5,540, in 
2011–2012 (Baum and Payea 2012).
With declining family resources and higher costs of attendance, 
students today by and large cannot forgo loans and instead turn to 
work to fi ll the fi nancial holes. The average unmet fi nancial need of 
Pell recipients is about $12,000 at four-year colleges and universities; a 
student must work, at federal minimum wage, almost 35 hours a week, 
52 weeks a year, to cover those costs, which research suggests is nearly 
impossible if the student hopes to complete college on time (Goldrick-
Rab 2013). Moreover, while many students have an “expected family 
contribution,” (EFC) which suggests that the family should be able to 
pay for college, some families are unable or unwilling to do so, and 
thus students borrow unsubsidized loans to cover that EFC. It is there-
fore unsurprising that over the last decade, the total number of federal 
Stafford Loan borrowers increased by 95 percent, from 5.4 million in 
2001–2002 to 10.4 million in 2011–2012 (Baum and Payea 2012). This 
means that the percentage of undergraduates holding loans grew from 
23 to 35 percent over that 10-year period. Moreover, the percentage 
of undergraduates borrowing both subsidized and unsubsidized federal 
loans grew from 9 percent in 2001–2002 to 25 percent in 2011–2012 
(College Board 2012).
Borrowing is more common among students at public universi-
ties and less so among students attending public two-year colleges. 
The percentage of students borrowing to attend public universities 
has remained steady at around 55 percent since 1999, but the average 
amount borrowed among bachelor’s degree recipients has grown from 
just over $20,000 to nearly $25,000. In addition, borrowing grew more 
rapidly from 2005–2006 to 2010–2011 than it had during the preceding 
fi ve years. Debt per borrower grew at an average annual rate of 2.1 per-
cent beyond infl ation, and average debt per graduate grew at an average 
annual rate of 2.7 percent (Baum and Payea 2012).
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Students from low-income families are far more likely to borrow 
for college. An analysis of bachelor’s degree recipients graduating from 
public universities in 2007–2008 found that 68 percent of students from 
families earning less than $30,000 per year had an average cumula-
tive debt load of $16,500, while just 40 percent of students from fami-
lies earning $120,000 or more annually held any debt, with an average 
amount of $14,500 (Baum and Payea 2012). The resulting disparity 
in debt-to-income ratio is substantial—low-income families hold debt 
amounting to about 70 percent of their income, while wealthier families 
have debt amounting to around 10 percent of income (a rate deemed 
manageable by the fi nancial industry).3
Evidence from several waves of the National Postsecondary Stu-
dent Aid Study (NPSAS) suggests that between 40 and 50 percent 
of students borrowing subsidized Stafford Loans took the maximum 
allowable amount over the past two decades, even after two increases in 
the maximum. More than one in four students borrowing the maximum 
amount of federal loans in the 2007–2008 academic year also took out 
a private loan or a federal PLUS loan (Wei and Skomsvold 2011). This 
suggests that more students are borrowing close to the limits and that 
loan caps may contribute to the mistaken appearance of loan aversion. 
There is some evidence that loan limits may hinder the ability of a small 
number of students to complete college; for example, recent work by 
Johnson (2013) found that a simulated $5,000 increase in student loan 
limits would increase bachelor’s degree attainment rates by 0.7 percent-
age points. Thus, even in the face of growing concern about the overall 
amount of borrowing, there is some reason to think that in the current 
context, students from low-income families might face greater odds of 
college success if they were willing or able to borrow more.
A DESCRIPTIVE PORTRAIT OF LOAN AVERSION
The body of research on loan aversion is mainly descriptive, with 
a few multivariate studies and laboratory experiments included. These 
provide a broad sense of the characteristics of students who decline 
loans, and some targeted tests of whether that apparent aversion can be 
overcome through intervention.
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The NPSAS of 2003–2004 can be used to form a portrait of loan-
averse students.4 An examination of this data by Cunningham and 
Santiago (2008) confi rms that students who decline to borrow have 
less unmet need—simply put, they do not need to borrow. In addi-
tion, among students with a signifi cant amount of unmet need ($2,000 
or more), loan aversion is more common among students from low-
income families, those who attend part time, and students attending 
public four-year (rather than private four-year) institutions. Loan aver-
sion is less common among black students compared to white students, 
and it is more common among Asian and Hispanic students compared 
to white students.
After comparing these results to data from the 1992–1993 NPSAS, 
Cunningham and Santiago (2008) note that racial/ethnic differences in 
borrowing seem to be a new phenomenon, emerging with the growth 
of students borrowing associated with the use of unsubsidized loans. 
This raises additional questions about whether the use of subsidized 
and unsubsidized loans differs by race/ethnicity as well.5 It is worth 
noting that research evidence has clearly established racial/ethnic varia-
tion in rates of loan default, with black students at the greatest risk of 
defaulting on their loans (Gross et al. 2009), even as the loans may be 
more effective in increasing completion rates (Jackson and Reynolds 
2013). 
Smaller qualitative studies identify similar patterns. For example, 
Burdman (2005) conducts interviews with students, counselors, out-
reach professionals, and fi nancial aid administrators that suggest that 
aversion to loans may reduce opportunities for a subset of low-income 
and minority students, particularly low-income, fi rst-generation, and 
Mexican-American students. She fi nds that students whose parents had 
less education appeared more likely to work full time and avoid bor-
rowing than students whose parents have college or graduate degrees. 
Among full-time students, those whose parents did not fi nish high 
school were more than twice as likely as those whose parents had grad-
uate degrees to work full time instead of borrowing. Among full-time 
dependent students, low-income students were less likely to borrow 
than other students, and when they did borrow, they took smaller loans. 
But debt aversion, she suggested, may also affect the initial choice of 
whether and where to attend college—before students have the oppor-
tunity to actually receive a loan offer and reject it.
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However, other evidence suggests that students may be mislabeled 
as loan averse when they are actually amenable to borrowing. For exam-
ple, Eckel et al. (2007) study educational fi nance preferences using an 
experiment in which real money was distributed (e.g., the choices were 
not hypothetical). The sample was drawn from across Canada and 
included 900 students aged 18–55 who were recruited for participation 
in the exercise. Based on the results, the authors conclude that debt 
aversion plays little or no role in the demand for postsecondary educa-
tion fi nance in the form of a loan. Students with experience carrying 
and managing debt are more willing than others to take on additional 
debt to fi nance postsecondary education. But presenting students with 
only loan options for postsecondary education is unlikely to negatively 
impact investment in postsecondary education, as long as care is taken 
that the price of the loans is not too high. Johnson and Montmarquette 
(2011) elicit similar fi ndings in another Canadian study with a sample 
of low-income and rural students. They fi nd a greater willingness to pay 
for college with loans among rural respondents, and no systematic loan 
aversion. Finally, in a third Canadian study, Palameta and Voyer (2010) 
fi nd that roughly 5–20 percent of their overall sample of low-income 
high school students was loan averse, depending on the price of the 
offered grant. In their experimental study, as the price of attending col-
lege increased, a higher percentage of students were inclined to choose 
a stand alone grant but not a grant/loan combination. The results show 
that overall some underrepresented groups are slightly but signifi cantly 
more likely to make loan-averse decisions. Of course, it is unclear if the 
Canadian context and student body is suffi ciently similar to the United 
States to extrapolate these fi ndings.
EXPLANATIONS FOR LOAN AVERSION: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE
Loan aversion is often described as common, unfortunate, and not 
easily overcome, but these depictions are typically based on conjecture 
rather than evidence. Reports on loan aversion, such as those issued 
by The Project on Student Debt and the Institute on Higher Education 
Policy (e.g., Burdman 2005; TICAS 2007; Cunningham and Santiago 
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2008) tend to point to two explanations for declining loans while pos-
sessing unmet fi nancial need: a preference for using alternative sources 
of fi nancing (e.g., savings or work earnings), or cultural/ethnic perspec-
tives that discourage borrowing. Practitioners suggest that aversion 
may be growing in response to the Great Recession and news about 
rising default rates in some sectors. But there are many more theoreti-
cal explanations for why students and families may choose to decline 
to accept the loans offered to them. In this section we adapt a model of 
understanding the use and effects of fi nancial aid initially described in 
Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel (2009).
First, families may vary in their fi nancial strength, and this could—
in a manner consistent with rational choice theory—lead them to 
decline loans. Families that can afford the net price of attendance, either 
because they have suffi cient wealth or receive suffi cient grant aid, may 
reject loans offered to them.6 Again, this is a heterogeneous group—
both the wealthiest and poorest families, those with the highest and 
lowest incomes, the highest and lowest EFCs, and who are facing the 
highest and lowest net prices are the most likely to borrow. But among 
students from low-income families, rational choice theory would lead 
to the expectation that loan aversion is more common among families 
with greater incomes, a higher EFC, or a lower net price. On the other 
hand, families with more debt may also be loan averse.
Another explanation for loan aversion points to the problem of 
informational asymmetries. Many policymakers, practitioners, and 
researchers highlight a large body of economic theory and evidence 
suggesting that college is an excellent investment for most low-income 
students, even as loan balances increase (Avery and Turner 2012; Baum 
and Schwartz 2012). On average, each additional year of education gen-
erates a payoff in the labor market, and the lifetime returns to degrees 
are substantial, even for groups marginalized by race, class, or ethnicity. 
Even during the recent deep recession, college graduates fared better 
than high school graduates (Carnevale, Rose, and Cheah 2011). Infor-
mational barriers are typically given as the reason why many students 
and families insist that the costs of attendance are too high and unaf-
fordable (Hoxby and Avery 2012; Hoxby and Turner 2013). At least 
one U.S. experiment indicates that providing more information can 
moderately reduce that perception (Hoxby and Turner 2013). However, 
an experiment in the Netherlands suggests the opposite, fi nding that 
up15bhslatch10.indd   325 2/17/2015   9:40:40 AM
326   Goldrick-Rab and Kelchen
students who receive additional information on the terms of loans do 
not adjust their loan-taking behaviors over time (Booij, Leuven, and 
Oosterbeek 2012).
Research by McKinney, Roberts, and Shefman (2013) indicates 
that many community college fi nancial aid counselors believe that their 
low-income students do not understand the long-term implications of 
taking out student loans. Similarly, some researchers contend that col-
lege attainment would increase if students had a “payback calculator” in 
hand when assessing the value of taking on another year of college and 
its accompanying debt (Haveman n.d.). In particular, if students could 
compare the value of a government-subsidized loan to the opportunity 
costs of working, they would choose to borrow (Baum and Schwartz 
2012). However, these payback calculators are usually designed to 
inform the initial attendance decision instead of whether to persist in 
college and have not been subjected to rigorous experimental testing.
Moreover, at least two studies question whether borrowing for col-
lege is inherently rational, noting that students who decline loans may 
be seeking to avoid temptation or trouble. Dowd (2008) posits that stu-
dents with stronger senses of self (e.g., internal locus of control and self-
control) and correspondingly higher educational expectations ought to 
behave more like econometricians when making decisions—presum-
ably increasing their likelihood of borrowing for college. However, 
Dowd is unable to empirically test this hypothesis. Instead, Cadena and 
Keys (2013) indirectly test the hypothesis that loan aversion is driven 
by self-control. They use two waves of federal NPSAS data by compar-
ing the rates of loan rejection among students who are living on and off 
campus and are eligible for the maximum amount of subsidized loans. 
They report that their fi ndings “support a self-control explanation . . . 
students are rejecting the loans, in part, to avoid the temptation to over-
spend out of borrowed money” (p. 1118).
It may also be the case that the decision to decline loans is related to 
students’ sense of why they are enrolled and what they aim to achieve, 
and particularly to variation in their expected returns. Evidence sug-
gests that students repeatedly revise and rethink their rationales for 
pursuing college degrees, practically on a daily basis, as they proceed 
through college (Armstrong and Hamilton 2013; Clydesdale 2007; 
Deil-Amen and Goldrick-Rab 2009; Manski and Wise 1983). Students 
who are academically prepared for college may perceive borrowing as 
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less risky, perhaps because pursuing college incurs fewer psychic costs. 
To be clear, while this idea expands on theories of college as a “great 
experiment” (Manski and Wise 1983), it is too simplistic to suggest that 
when college feels worthwhile, students will decide to take on loans, as 
other contexts can also offset or mediate these decisions. For example, 
some research indicates that the longer a student is enrolled in college, 
the less likely she or he is to be risk averse (Davies and Lea 1995). The 
increase in a student’s debt load seems to precede a change in their feel-
ings toward debt—in other words the more debt accrued, the greater the 
tolerance for debt.
One key attribute of many theories of loan aversion, particularly 
those drawn from economics, is that they are methodologically indi-
vidualistic in their approach, assuming that students make borrowing 
decisions independently. But there is a growing body of research sug-
gesting differential responsiveness to fi nancing options according to 
the setting and context in which decisions are made (Armstrong and 
Hamilton 2013; Dowd 2008; Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel 2009; 
Hossler, Schmit, and Vesper 1999; McDonough 1997; Paulsen and St. 
John 1997; Perna 2006, 2008; St. John, Paulsen, and Carter 2005; Tinto 
1993). Individuals can make decisions in the context of their familial 
needs or their community needs, and the role played by those other 
actors is more important than what is assumed by “preferences” in eco-
nomic models, since the infl uence of those contexts can be reciprocal. 
For example, loan decisions may be both shaped by and contribute to 
the social and cultural capital students obtain from their relationships 
(Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel 2009; McDonough and Calderone 
2006; Paulsen and St. John 1997).
More broadly, a student’s willingness to borrow may be moderated 
by university institutional culture—specifi cally, how university admin-
istrators, faculty, staff, and students explicitly and implicitly add (or 
reduce) college costs by demanding more (or less) from students in 
order for them to fully engage in college life. Indeed, borrowing behav-
iors vary substantially by institution and how much time students spend 
in college. At schools like most of those in this study—public universi-
ties—56 percent of students who spent a year or less enrolled without 
completing a degree borrowed, compared to 63 percent of those who 
stayed up to two years (Baum and Payea 2012). While such institutional 
differences in loan taking are well documented, explanations for those 
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differences are not always articulated (Cunningham and Santiago 2008; 
Gross et al. 2009).
In Paying for the Party, Armstrong and Hamilton (2013) document 
the impacts of what Jacob, McCall, and Stange (2013) term the “country-
clubifi cation” of state universities. Responding to the demands of many 
wealthy and out-of-state students for the college experiences that pre-
serve and enhance their existing social advantages, these public institu-
tions are increasingly spending limited resources to create opportuni-
ties and settings for elitist socialization. High-income students respond 
positively to higher sticker prices, seeking out colleges and universi-
ties that cost more, while low-income students prefer institutions that 
cost less (Hoxby and Avery 2012). The expenses associated with higher 
sticker prices crowd out other spending, and the resulting climate has 
the potential to alienate working-class students for whom college is 
meant to be a route out of poverty, not a visit to elite cultures. They can-
not participate without taking on loans, and even with the loans, they 
often still cannot afford full participation.
On the other hand, loan aversion may be related to the familial 
environments in which students were raised. This would be consistent 
with evidence on risk aversion. For example, Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, 
and Sørensen (2011) provide evidence from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), measuring risk aversion based on a set of survey 
questions probing respondents’ willingness to accept jobs with various 
combinations of income probabilities. Risk aversion is inferred from 
the answers to these questions, and the composite risk-aversion mea-
sure is regressed on a variety of background variables. The authors fi nd 
that the best demographic predictors of risk aversion are age, gender, 
and parental education, as well as whether they lived with both parents 
when they were younger. They fi nd that males and children of more 
educated parents are less risk averse. While they do not fi nd that income 
is a predictor of risk aversion, this is partly because parents’ education 
and income are correlated; they do fi nd a simple (negative) correlation 
with risk aversion as expected.
Absent suffi cient social capital to help them understand student 
loans in particular, students may seek attitude-behavior consistency by 
either refusing loans because they also refuse credit cards, or reframing 
student debt as different from other forms of debt so as to justify accept-
ing it. For example, Davies and Lea (1995) describe students who are 
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averse to taking on debt but maintain consistency between that attitude 
and their behavior (loan taking in college) by not recognizing student 
loans as like credit card debt. The way debt is framed may therefore be 
important to whether or not students accept it. In a laboratory experi-
ment conducted with fi nancial aid recipients in Chile, Colombia, and 
Mexico, Caetano, Palacios, and Patrinos (2011) conclude that debt 
aversion—widely detected in their sample—is due to labeling effects. 
Specifi cally, labeling a contract as a “loan” decreased its probability of 
being selected over a fi nancially equivalent “contract” by more than 8 
percent. The authors also fi nd that students are willing to pay a premium 
of about 4 percent of the fi nanced value to avoid a contract labeled as 
debt. They conclude that debt aversion exists and may potentially dis-
tort investments.
Another possibility is that students’ orientations toward loans are 
related to their familial beliefs, particularly their time horizon or future 
time perspective, a measure of the extent to which individuals focus on 
the future rather than the present or past. This time horizon is typically 
measured using a discount rate, which refl ects the weight that individu-
als place on events in the future compared to those of today. Individuals 
with a future orientation, which is considered a hallmark of “modern” 
American life, tend to have lower discount rates as they place relatively 
more weight on the future and a longer time horizon. Meanwhile, a 
present orientation, with a higher discount rate and a shorter time hori-
zon, is labeled traditional, and in a sense, “backward.”
Economists theorize that students who have a long time horizon—
those who give considerable weight in their thinking to their long-
term well-being—are more likely to make investments with long-term 
payoffs, including investing in retirement savings and borrowing for 
school. There are clear socioeconomic differences in time horizons. 
For example, Lawrence (1991) shows that higher socioeconomic adults 
(those who tend to be white and who have higher incomes) have longer 
time horizons. Specifi cally, these adults evidently “discount” or reduce 
the value of future costs and benefi ts at a rate of 12 percent per year, 
whereas economically disadvantaged adults discount the future at a rate 
of 19 percent per year, compared to the 8–9 percent yield of long-term 
Treasury notes during that time frame. Put differently, the time horizon 
of economically disadvantaged people is less than two-thirds as long 
as economically advantaged people. Similarly, a study conducted in 
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Canada examines loan aversion among students from a range of family 
income backgrounds, using a set of lab experiments. The authors fi nd 
that loan aversion was more common for low-income students because 
they had a greater tendency to discount future rewards (Palameta and 
Voyer 2010).
However, it is also possible that a shorter time horizon is linked 
to variation in expected returns to college, particularly due to the esti-
mated chances of completing degrees and fi nding employment after 
graduation. For example, Latino students interviewed in focus groups 
in one study expressed an aversion to loans because they must be 
repaid even if degrees are not completed. They also said they would 
prefer to make their college choices based on their current economic 
situations and what they can afford while managing their family and 
personal responsibilities. “They would rather ‘pay as they go,’ and 
they believe they can get a quality education wherever they enroll, 
as long as they are motivated” (Cunningham and Santiago 2008, 
p. 18). This may be related to the disproportionate number of Latino 
(and Asian) students from immigrant families, which tend to operate in 
unbanked cash economies (Teranishi 2010). Very different results were 
obtained from a sample studied at one California university (Brint and 
Rotondi 2008), where the authors report that students no longer think 
of loans as a burden to be avoided or discharged quickly, but rather as 
a means of freedom, which opens up (rather than limits) behavioral 
options. The increased availability of loan repayment options—such as 
income-based repayment, income-contingent repayment, and pay-as-
you-earn—has the potential to reduce the risk of borrowing for college, 
but these programs are only utilized by a small percentage of eligible 
students. Only one-tenth of the 15 million students with Federal Direct 
Loans are enrolled in these income-based options (Chopra 2013).
A low future time perspective, or a past orientation, appears unre-
sponsive to changes in information possessed by the individual. For 
example, in a study of retirement savings, Jacobs-Lawshen and Her-
shey (2005) fi nd that increasing the knowledge of fi nancial planning 
among those with a past orientation induced no increase in their rates 
of retirement savings. They conclude, “When it comes to savings, it is 
diffi cult to overcome a short time horizon. Failing to look to the future 
ensures a minimal impact of risk tolerance on saving, almost irrespec-
tive of how much one knows about financial planning” ( p. 339). A criti-
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cal question is whether saving for retirement should be thought of as 
comparable to borrowing for college, given the long-term payoffs, and 
whether or not borrowing for college is a “failure” in the same way that 
not saving for retirement is said to be. Additionally, a study by Norvili-
tis and Mendes-Da-Silva (2013) provides some indication that students 
with a stronger sense of delayed gratifi cation (a future orientation) have 
lower levels debt.
Another aspect of students’ preferences, which may be grounded 
in the beliefs of their families, relates to their work orientation. More 
than 75 percent of undergraduates work, but according to some studies, 
working during college (especially over long hours), has been linked to 
lower rates of degree completion (King 2002; Pascarella and Terenzini 
2005). Other studies, however, fi nd the opposite (Bozick 2007; Staff 
and Mortimer 2007; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003). A posited 
advantage of loans, therefore, has been the ability to alleviate the need 
to work (or work so much). But a work orientation may go beyond a 
preference, especially when one considers the value that some individu-
als place on working, or what some sociologists refer to as the “central-
ity” of work. Put simply, people have many reasons for working, some 
of which are not plainly economic. For example, ethnographic evidence 
indicates that some students elect to work in order to honor their family 
or culture, or because they have always worked (Mortimer 2003; Weis 
1985). If work is central to the lives of students, serving to connect 
them to others and bring meaning to their lives, then it may well not be 
replaced with loans (Feldman and Doerpinghaus 1992; Lobel 1991).
It may also be the case that students vary in the social capital they 
can draw on to understand and make sense of loans. One of the primary 
diffi culties with current fi nancial aid policy is that it is poorly under-
stood by nearly all of its constituents (Goldrick-Rab and Roksa 2008). 
Most people do not know what opportunities for aid exist, how to access 
the various programs, and what one can expect to receive. Low-income 
parents and students are less likely to receive high-quality information 
about fi nancial aid opportunities, and as a result are less likely to fi le a 
federal application for student aid (FAFSA) or apply to more expensive 
colleges (which may, in fact, offer them a better fi nancial aid pack-
age) (Long 2008). Upper-income students receive information about 
college from a variety of sources, while low-income students rely on 
their high school counselors, largely because their parents and siblings 
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did not attend college (Cabrera and La Nasa 2000). As a result, students 
from poor families who would likely qualify for all or nearly all of the 
aid required to fi nance college fail to even apply, since they have lim-
ited access to information about how to apply for aid, little assistance 
in fi lling out the extraordinarily complex application, and substantial 
(and warranted) fears that college is unaffordable. Students from low-
income families who are insuffi ciently educated as to the variation in 
quality among college fi nancing strategies, and frustrated by the time-
consuming nature of the application process, unwittingly take on high-
interest private loans, credit cards, or off-campus employment without 
complete knowledge of the consequences (Cabrera and La Nasa 2000). 
Thus, the amount of social capital held, as embodied in, for example, 
assistance with the FAFSA, may explain disparities in loan aversion.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Drawing on this wide array of prior economic and sociological 
theory and evidence, we conceive of the choices involved in accepting 
or rejecting student loans as involving both individual-level and family 
or community decisions. We ask the following fi ve research questions:
1) How does the way loan aversion is measured affect the assess-
ment of which students are loan averse?
2) What are the key demographic disparities in loan aversion 
among students from low-income families?
3) Which of the following factors appears to moderate those 
observed disparities in loan aversion: family fi nancial strength; 
perceived returns to degree; fi nancial knowledge; attitudes, 
beliefs, and dispositions; work behaviors; and social capital?
4) How is the assessment of these moderators affected by mea-
surement of loan aversion?
5) How is loan aversion related to postsecondary outcomes? 
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METHODOLOGY
Using survey and administrative records for a sample of Pell Grant 
recipients participating in the Wisconsin Scholars Longitudinal Study 
(WSLS), we examine the incidence and correlates of loan-taking behav-
iors among low-income students—all of whom have unmet fi nancial 
need—and consider a range of potential explanations for observed vari-
ation in these.7 To examine the reasons for loan aversion, we focus on a 
relatively young sample of fi rst-time, full-time undergraduates attend-
ing two-year and four-year colleges in one state’s public higher educa-
tion system. In addition, after exploring institutional differences in loan 
taking, we use college fi xed effects to control for any institutional dif-
ferences and focus on student-level differences.
Setting
This study takes place in Wisconsin, where more than 80 percent 
of undergraduates are enrolled in the public University of Wisconsin 
(UW) System and Wisconsin Technical College System. As in many 
states, over the past decade state appropriations per full-time equiva-
lent student have declined (State Higher Education Executive Offi cers 
2013). As a result, the costs of attendance continue to rise, and demon-
strated need unmet through fi nancial grant aid is swelling. For example, 
in 2010–2011, the average family contribution to college costs in the 
UW System was $4,686, the average amount of need-based aid was 
$7,303, and the average amount of unmet fi nancial need was $5,236—
up from $1,951 in 2002–2003 (Wisconsin Higher Educational Aids 
Board 2012).
Wisconsin is also typical when it comes to key indicators of college 
access and success. The on-time college-going rate among high school 
graduates is 61 percent (the national average is 62 percent), the average 
ACT composite test score is 22 (the national average is 21), 52 percent 
of undergraduates fi le applications for fi nancial aid (compared to 50 
percent nationally), the fi rst-to-second-year retention rate at universities 
is 77 percent (76 percent nationally), and the six-year graduation rate 
for bachelor’s students is 58 percent (56 percent nationally) (Goldrick-
Rab and Harris 2010).
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Data
Data for this study come from multiple sources, and all details of 
each measure are provided in Table 10.1. We utilize two measures of 
loan aversion. The fi rst is based on a question administered in a survey 
conducted during the students’ fi rst semester of college, in fall 2008. 
As part of a much longer survey about college plans and fi nances, stu-
dents were asked: “Suppose you could take out a loan up to $10,000 
with a 7 percent interest rate. How much money would you take?” Stu-
dents could choose from the following fi ve choices: $0, $1,000, $2,500, 
$5,000, and $10,000. In fall 2008, the interest rate on subsidized student 
loans was 6.0 percent, and for unsubsidized student loans the rate was 
6.8 percent.8 We did not tell the students this information in the sur-
vey, and the overall responses and level of fi nancial aid knowledge sug-
gested in the study provide little reason to think that they were aware 
the degree to which the rate we inquired about was slightly higher than 
the current unsubsidized rate and a point higher than the subsidized 
rate. At the time data were collected, income-based repayment was not 
available.9 We code students who said they would take none of the loan 
they were offered as loan averse.
In addition, we used information from students’ fi nancial aid pack-
ages, also obtained in fall 2008, which indicated whether students were 
offered loans, how much they were offered and of what type (subsi-
dized or unsubsidized), and the amount accepted. This is an uncommon 
approach, as few data sets include loan offered, usually only recording 
the loans accepted.10 We code a student as loan averse if she refused 
all loans offered in that term.11 We also include a substantial number 
of demographic characteristics and measures of moderating concepts 
drawn from both survey and administrative data. All details on these 
are found in Table 10.1.
Sample
The overall WSLS sample includes 3,000 students. For this chapter, 
we focus on a subsample that includes the 684 students attending 10 of 
the state’s 13 public universities and the 13 public two-year colleges 
for whom we observe both the key survey and administrative measures 
of loan aversion described above. The sample is 58 percent female and 
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74 percent non-Hispanic white, and almost 80 percent of the students 
lack a parent with a bachelor’s degree. About 4 percent of the students 
are fi rst-generation immigrants, 10 percent are second-generation, and 
9 percent speak a language other than English in their homes. On aver-
age, in their fi rst year of college these Pell recipients faced a net price 
of more than $8,000 after taking all grant aid into account. Most of 
them had a substantial amount of unmet fi nancial need, as defi ned by 
the cost of attendance less all grant aid. On average, unmet need was 
$7,700. More specifi cally, over 85 percent had unmet need exceeding 
$3,500 (the maximum subsidized Stafford Loan for fi rst-year students), 
and 72 percent had unmet need of greater than the $5,500 that fi rst-year 
students may borrow in subsidized and unsubsidized loans.
Almost 17 percent of these students grew up in poverty, and almost 
one-third qualify for a zero expected family contribution, meaning that 
their families are not expected to pay anything toward their postsecond-
ary education. About 12 percent of students reported providing fi nan-
cial support to their families when attending school, with more than 
one-third feeling a sense of fi nancial obligation to their families, and 
25 percent drawing no monetary support from their families. They held 
very little credit card debt—just about $150 on average. Fifty-eight per-
cent of students in the sample did not even have a credit card.
In terms of academic preparation, students had an ACT score of 
just over 21, the statewide average, and nearly three quarters had strong 
high school preparation for college, but only about half said it was 
extremely likely that they would complete a bachelor’s degree, and one 
in fi ve said they were having trouble with college. On average, they 
expected to enter a career paying just over $60,000 per year. Slightly 
more than 60 percent of students answered at least 12 of 15 questions 
regarding fi nancial knowledge correctly, and just under half said they 
were competent at managing their money.
This sample of Pell Grant recipients exhibits a long time horizon 
and overwhelming willingness to sacrifi ce today’s needs for their future 
potential. Very few indicate a general averse to all forms of debt. About 
95 percent evidenced an internal locus of control, and 75 percent said 
that debt was not a normative part of today’s lifestyle or that taking out 
loans was a good thing to help you enjoy life. The vast majority worked 
while in high school, and about half worked while in college as well, an 
average of eight hours per week.
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Table 10.1  Description of Measures, Sources, and Coding
Concept/measure Source Question wording (survey) Response categories Coding
Loan aversion
Aversion A Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008
Suppose you could take out 
a loan up to $10,000 with a 7 
percent interest rate. How much 
money would you take?
$0, $1,000, $2,500, $5,000, 
and $10,000  
Loan averse = $0
Aversion B Financial aid 
package, Fall 
2008
Loan averse = accepted $0 of 
loan offered, conditional on 
offer
Demographics
Gender Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008
What is your gender? Female, male Female = 1
Race/ethnicity Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008
What is your race/ethnicity? Non-Hispanic White, African-
American, Latino, Southeast 
Asian, Native American
If multiple categories were 






What is the highest level of 
education completed by either 
parent?
Grade 1–8, some high school, 
GED, high school graduate, 
some college/technical degree/
associate’s, bachelor’s degree, 
master’s degree or above
First-generation student = no 






Were you/your mother/your 
father born in the United 
States?
Yes/no 1st gen = student born outside 






What language is spoken most 
often inside your family's 
home?
English, Spanish, Hmong, 
Chinese, other
Other than English = 1
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Institutional cost




institutional cost of attendance 
and all grant aid awarded to 
student




Survey, Fall 2009 “When I was growing up there 
wasn’t enough to eat at home.” 
“When I was growing up I had 
to wear secondhand clothes.”







Computed using 2008 FAFSA 
and federal formula; both 
continuous measure and fl ag 





“Since starting college, have 
you regularly given any family 
or friends (not including 
spouses) more than $50 per 
month? Do not include loans.”






“I feel obligated to support my 
family fi nancially.” 
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement
1 = Somewhat or strongly 
agree





“In the past year…my family 
provided money for my 
education.”
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement
1 = Not at all
Credit card debt Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008
“How much do you owe 
on all of your credit cards 
combined?”
<$100; $100–499; $500–999; 
$1,000–4,999; $5,000 or more
(continued)
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“How likely are each of the 
following scenarios; you will 
get a bachelor's degree”
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement
1 = Extremely likely







Presence or absence of 
“Academic Competitiveness 
Grant”
ACG was a federal grant 
indicating the student had 
completed rigorous high 
school coursework, based on 
an analysis of transcripts
1 = ACG present
Course diffi culty Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008
“Classes are more diffi cult 
than I expected.”
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement








“For the career you most plan 
to have, how much money do 
you expect to make in a year?”







“What is the difference between 
a grant and a loan?” “Which 
statement best describes the 
difference between a subsidized 
and unsubsidized loan?” And 
two series of questions about 
fi nancial aid criteria and credit 
scores
15 Items testing general 
fi nancial literacy and specifi c 
fi nancial aid knowledge (see 
notes for more)
Coded 0–15, also high = 12+
Table 10.1  (continued)
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“How well do you think you 
handle managing money?”
5-point Likert scale 1 = Very or extremely well
Attitudes, beliefs, 
dispositions
Time horizon Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008
“If you were guaranteed you 
would receive the money, 
which of the following options 
would you select right now?”
$75 right now; $100 in 3 
months; $250 in one year; 
$500 in 3 years
Coded as four binary variables 





“I am willing to sacrifi ce today 
so that my life will be better 
tomorrow.” 
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement






“Is it ever okay to borrow 
money?”
Yes/no 1 = Yes
Self-control Baseline survey, 
Fall 2008
“Being in debt is part of today's 
lifestyle.” “Taking out a loan is 
a good thing because it allows 
you to enjoy life.”
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement
1 = Somewhat or strongly 
disagree with either statement




“I am responsible for what 
happens to me.”
5-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement/disagreement
1 = Somewhat or strongly 
agree
Work behaviors




“When you were a high school 
senior how many hours, on 
average, did you work each 
week?”






“Have you been working since 
you started college?”
Yes/no Coded 1 = yes
(continued)
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“In the last seven days how 
many hours did you spend 
working on-campus? Working 
off-campus?”







“Who helped you fi ll out your 
fi nancial aid application? 
Check all that apply.”
Parent, sibling, spouse, 
guidance counselor, friend, 
someone else, no one (fi lled it 
out myself) 
No help; family (parent, 
sibling spouse); other (friend, 








“Did the person who helped 
you earn a college degree?”
Yes/no Coded 1 = yes




“How confi dent are you that, if 
faced with fi nancial problems, 
you could get help from other 
people rather than dropping out 
of school?”









Table 10.1  (continued)
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NOTE: The data set includes a measure of religious preference and a measure of work centrality but both lack suffi cient variation for inclusion.
Measures of fi nancial knowledge include A) In your opinion what is the difference between a grant and a loan? (i) Grant comes from Federal gov-
ernment, loans come from Wisconsin; (ii) A grant doesn’t have to be paid back; a loan has to be paid back; (iii) A grant has to be paid back but no 
interest is charged, a loan must be paid back and interest is charged. B) Which of the following describes the biggest difference between subsidized 
and unsubsidized Stafford Loans? (i) A subsidized loan does not charge interest, an unsubsidized loan charges interest, (ii) a subsidized loan is paid 
for by parents, an unsubsidized loan is paid off by students, (iii) a subsidized loan costs students more than an unsubsidized loan, (iv) a subsidized 
loan does not charge interest until the student leaves college, an unsubsidized loan begins to charge interest as soon as the student receives the loan. 
C) Agree/disagree: A government loan is a kind of fi nancial aid. D) Agree/disagree: The money students earn while working in college is used to 
calculate how much aid they get. E) Agree/disagree: If a student earns more than a certain amount from working, their fi nancial aid might be reduced. 
F) Agree/disagree: Students receive the same amount of fi nancial aid for every year they are in school. G) Agree/disagree: Students will receive the 
same amount of fi nancial aid if they switch schools. H) Agree/disagree: Students who take time off from school will get the same amount of fi nancial 
aid if/when they return. I) Which of the following factors are used to calculate credit scores? Check all that apply: number of jobs held, amount of 
existing debt, gender, whether payments were made on time, types of credit used, race/ethnicity, recent applications for credits cards or other loans.
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It is worth noting that Avery and Turner (2012) hypothesize that 
the FAFSA is one of the greatest deterrents to loan taking, but in this 
sample we observe a substantial group of needy students who com-
plete the FAFSA and still decline all loans. Most students in the sample 
(87 percent) got assistance from a family member when completing 
the FAFSA for college, with about 42 percent getting assistance from a 
college-educated person. But only about one-third reported being con-
fi dent that they could obtain fi nancial help if in trouble so as to avoid 
leaving college. Overall, about 70 percent of these students remained 
enrolled at their initial institution a year after they fi rst began.
Table 10.2 also compares the characteristics of this sample to the 
characteristics of all students in the WSLS attending those same uni-
versities and colleges. There are some notable differences between the 
analytic sample and the overall WSLS sample, with the analytic sample 
being less racially diverse and by some measures more economically 
advantaged. These are important considerations when thinking about 
the generalizability of the results.
Analysis
We use blocked probit regressions with marginal effects to examine 
potential explanations for why students decline loans—we do this fi rst 
using the administrative measure (Table 10.6) and then the survey mea-
sure (Table 10.7). We also use probit regression to examine the associa-
tion between loan aversion and college performance and retention.
BORROWING BEHAVIORS AMONG PELL 
GRANT RECIPIENTS
Next, we describe the fi ndings regarding the measurement of loan 
aversion, the characteristics of loan-averse students, and the charac-
teristics of institutions where loan-averse students are more or less 
prevalent.
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Table 10.2  Descriptive Statistics by Sample Inclusion
Characteristic Not in sample
Analytic sample 
difference
Female (%) 54.6 4.2
(2.7)
Race/ethnicity (%)




Hmong (Southeast Asian) 10.0 −2.4
(1.8)




Parental education < bachelor’s degree (%) 78.6 0.9
(2.5)
Immigrant status
First-generation (%) 6.9 −2.4*
(1.4)
Second-generation (%) 12.0 −2.5
(2.0)
English not fi rst language (%) 12.4 −3.4*
(1.9)
Institutional cost
Net price ($) 6,199 1,596***
(322)
Family fi nancial strength
Childhood poverty (%) 9.3 6.8***
(1.8)
Expected family contribution ($) 1,447 280***
(107)
Zero EFC (%) 35.0 −7.6***
(2.5)
Financial reciprocity (%) 12.6 −1.4
(2.0)
Financial obligation to family (%) 34.5 −1.3
(3.0)
(continued)
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Characteristic Not in sample
Analytic sample 
difference
No fi nancial help from family (%) 20.0 5.7**
(2.6)
Credit card debt ($) 107 54*
(29)
Perceived returns to degree
Likely to complete bachelor’s degree (%) 51.6 1.5
(3.2)
ACT score 21.5 0.2
(0.4)
Strong high school coursework (%) 71.9 5.6
(4.0)
College diffi culty (%) 20.5 12.8
(2.4)
Expected monetary returns to degree ($) 60,362 438
(3,725)
Financial knowledge
Overall knowledge 11.8 0.2
(0.1)
High fi nancial knowledge (%) 59.5 3.8
(3.1)
Perceived fi nancial competence (%) 42.8 1.7
(3.1)
Attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions
Time horizon (%)
$75 right now 22.5 −2.4
(2.6)
$100 in three months 16.2 −0.4
(2.4)
$250 in one year 16.1 0.4
(2.3)
$500 in three years 45.2 2.4
(3.2)
Willing to sacrifi ce (%) 76.1 7.8***
(2.6)
Table 10.2  (continued)
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Characteristic Not in sample
Analytic sample 
difference
Generalized debt aversion (%) 5.9 −0.1
(1.4)
Self-control (%) 79.7 −3.5
(2.6)
Internal locus of control (%) 94.5 2.8**
(1.3)
Work behaviors
Worked in high school (%) 83.8 3.0
(2.2)
Currently working (%) 53.2 −0.2
(3.2)
Current number of hours working 8.6 −1.0
(0.8)
Social capital
FAFSA assistance—type of person (%)




Other person 14.3 −4.0*
(2.1)




Confi dent help is available (%) 34.5 3.3
(3.0)
Retention at initial college in year 2 (%) 69.5 2.8
(2.5)
Maximum sample size 880 684
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Loan 
aversion categories were defi ned in the following ways: 1) Administrative: If a student 
accepted none of his/her loan offer (if offered any). 2) Survey: If responded he/she 
would not take any money at a 7 percent interest rate. The sample includes students at 
included UW System campuses only. 
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.2  (continued)
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Measurement
As noted earlier, most research on loan aversion has been conducted 
using either in-depth interviews or surveys. Measuring loan aversion 
in this way inherently relies on student self-reports of attitudes and/or 
behaviors and does not capture their actual behaviors. For this reason, 
we begin with a simple analysis triangulating how these two sources of 
data align when it comes to classifying students as loan averse. In total, 
48 percent of the sample is loan averse according to either the survey or 
the administrative measures. The survey measure classifi es 401 of stu-
dents as loan averse, while the administrative measure applies that label 
to just 128 students. As Table 10.3 indicates, we fi nd that the correlation 
between the survey and administrative measures is weak (r = 0.21) and 
aligned for only 64 percent of the sample, with 52 percent agreement 
that a student is not loan averse, and 12 percent agreement that the stu-
dent is loan averse. Fully 29 percent of the sample would be classifi ed 
as loan averse using the survey measure, even though in practice they 
accepted loans. In addition, 7 percent of students who said they would 
not borrow loans according to the survey did accept loans according to 
the administrative data. While these differences could be explained by 
other factors (for example, students might report not wanting to take 
loans but do it anyway), and therefore this evidence is not suffi cient to 
record these as “misclassifi cations,” the apparent disconnect is worthy 
of further investigation.
It is possible that some students who expressed loan aversion on 
the survey may have done so because they had already accepted loans 
and did not (or could not) want to borrow more. Nearly 72 percent of 
students whom according to the survey might be loan averse do appear 
Table 10.3  Relationship between Survey and Administrative Data 
Measures of Loan Aversion
Administrative data (%)
Survey data Borrower Loan averse
Borrower 52 7
Loan averse 29 12
NOTE: Total sample size = 684; percentaged according to that total R = 0.213.
SOURCE: Survey data are from the fall WSLS, and administrative data are from the 
University of Wisconsin system.
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to be in this category, suggesting that loan aversion using survey data 
may be overstated. On the other hand, the survey classifi ed about 7 
percent of students as willing to accept loans, even though the adminis-
trative data indicate that they refused the loans they were offered. This 
may be because students regretted the decision to refuse loans and were 
expressing on the survey a wish to take them, or because on the survey 
the students meant they would take them, but not right now or not under 
the conditions in which they were offered.
Given the indication of apparently substantial measurement error 
present when loan aversion is measured using survey data, we take 
additional steps in the next analyses to consider which students may be 
mislabeled as loan averse when only survey data are used.
Student-Level Differences in Borrowing
Table 10.4 displays the differences in characteristics between loan-
averse students and borrowers using both the administrative data mea-
sure of loan aversion and the survey measure of loan aversion. The 
overall trends in student characteristics are consistent with most prior 
research. We fi nd that Southeast Asian students (predominately Hmong 
in this sample) are greatly overrepresented among loan-averse students, 
while African Americans are substantially overrepresented among loan 
takers. Both fi rst- and second-generation immigrants and students for 
whom English is not spoken at home are far more likely to be loan 
averse. In this sample of students from low-income families, where 
almost 80 percent of students do not have at least one parent with a 
bachelor’s degree, more parental education seems to lead to less loan 
aversion. Students facing higher net prices were also less likely to be 
loan averse.
Notably, students from families with less fi nancial strength are 
more often loan averse. This is also more common among students who 
grew up in poverty or have lower expected family contributions, and 
among those who report that their families do not provide monetary 
support for their college education and yet feel obligated to fi nancially 
support their family while in college.
We hypothesized that students who perceive stronger returns to 
their degrees would be more likely to borrow for college, but we fi nd 
limited support for this assertion. Overall, it seems that students with 
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Table 10.4  Descriptive Statistics by Borrowing Behavior 
Admin. sample Survey sample Test for 
measurement 
difference             
(p-value)Characteristic Borrowers
 Loan averse 
difference Borrowers
 Loan averse 
difference
Demographics
Female (%) 57.8 5.6 59.8 −2.4 0.167
(5.2) (4.1)
Race/ethnicity (%)
Non-Hispanic White 76.4 −10.9** 74.9 −0.9 0.051
(4.8) (3.5)
Latino 5.1 2.5 5.8 −0.7 0.262
(2.6) (1.8)
Hmong (Southeast Asian) 5.3 13.5*** 5.2 5.9*** 0.032
(3.7) (2.2)
Native American 2.9 0.6 2.8 0.6 0.992
(2.0) (1.4)
Black 8.4 −4.8*** 9.0 −3.5* 0.622
(1.8) (2.0)
Parental education < bachelor’s degree (%) 79.9 −2.4 80.8 −3.4 0.858
(4.4) (3.3)
Immigrant status
First-generation (%) 3.2 7.3*** 2.2 5.4*** 0.468
(2.8) (1.7)
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Second-generation (%) 8.1 8.0** 8.6 2.2 0.115
(3.7) (2.4)
English not fi rst language (%) 6.2 16.2*** 6.5 5.9** 0.008
(4.0) (2.4)
Institutional cost
Net price ($) 8,027 −1,322*** 8,391 −1,428*** 0.808
(385) (290)
Family fi nancial strength
Childhood poverty (%) 15.3 4.5 15.0 2.6 0.654
(4.1) (3.0)
Expected family contribution ($) 1499 −396*** 1475 −109 0.062
(137) (113)
Zero EFC (%) 27.6 6.3 27.3 3.5 0.614
(4.9) (3.8)
Financial reciprocity (%) 10.8 2.4 11.3 −0.2 0.486
(3.4) (2.6)
Financial obligation to family (%) 31.3 11.1** 29.8 8.4** 0.638
(5.2) (4.0)
No fi nancial help from family (%) 23.7 11.2** 25.6 0.3 0.043
(5.0) (3.7)
Credit card debt ($) 157 24 220 −139*** 0.066
(69) (41)
(continued)
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350   Admin. sample Survey sample Test for 
measurement 
difference             
(p-value)Characteristic Borrowers
 Loan averse 
difference Borrowers
 Loan averse 
difference
Perceived returns to degree
Likely to complete bachelor’s degree (%) 53.5 −1.9 53.2 −0.2 0.774
(5.3) (4.1)
ACT score 21.8 −0.7 21.5 0.5 0.014
(0.4) (0.3)
Strong high school coursework (%) 78.9 −8.1* 75.9 3.8 0.020
(4.6) (3.4)
College diffi culty (%) 34.1 −4.1 37.7 −10.4*** 0.253
(4.8) (3.8)
Expected monetary returns to degree ($) 61,510 −4,228 60,844 −108 0.487
(4,306) (4,442)
Financial knowledge
Overall knowledge 12.0 −0.2 12.0 0.0 0.280
(0.2) (0.2)
Above average fi nancial knowledge (%) 63.2 0.8 62.1 3.0 0.702
(5.2) (4.0)
Perceived fi nancial competence (%) 44.1 1.7 41.8 6.3 0.436
(5.3) (4.1)
Table 10.4  (continued)
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Attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions
Time horizon (%)
$75 right now 20.8 −3.7 22.1 −4.7 0.830
(3.9) (3.2)
$100 in three months 16.5 −3.7 16.4 −1.4 0.581
(3.3) (3.0)
$250 in one year 16.8 −1.7 18.5 −4.8 0.405
(3.9) (3.0)
$500 in three years 46.0 9.1* 43.0 11.0*** 0.747
(5.2) (4.1)
Willing to sacrifi ce (%) 84.1 −1.2 84.3 −0.9 0.945
(3.9) (3.1)
Generalized debt aversion (%) 5.4 2.7 5.7 0.3 0.440
(2.7) (1.9)
Self-control (%) 74.8 8.1** 70.7 13.2*** 0.262
(4.0) (3.4)
Internal locus of control (%) 97.5 −0.9 97.0 0.9 0.414
(1.8) (1.3)
Work behaviors
Worked in high school (%) 87.0 −1.0 88.1 −3.0 0.621
(3.4) (2.8)
Currently working (%) 50.8 13.1** 50.1 6.9* 0.303
(5.3) (4.2)
Current number of hours working 6.9 3.9*** 7.2 0.9 0.014
(1.2) (0.8)
(continued)
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352   Admin. sample Survey sample Test for 
measurement 
difference             
(p-value)Characteristic Borrowers
 Loan averse 
difference Borrowers
 Loan averse 
difference
Social capital
FAFSA assistance—type of person (%)
No help—fi lled out alone 12.7 −1.6 11.9 1.3 0.493
(3.4) (2.8)
Family 84.6 −3.5 84.9 −2.1 0.767
(4.0) (3.0)
Other person 8.7 9.4** 10.4 −0.2 0.018
(3.9) (2.4)







Confi dent help is available (%) 38.1 −1.8 32.8 12.0*** 0.016
(5.1) (4.0)
Retention at initial college in year 2 (%) 76.2 0.6 72.1 10.2*** 0.055
(4.4) (3.4)
Sample size 556 128 401 283
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Difference = difference in means between borrowers and 
loan-averse students. Loan aversion categories were defi ned in the following ways: Administrative: If a student accepted none of his/her 
loan offer (if offered any). Survey: If responded he/she would not take any money at a 7 percent interest rate. The sample includes UW 
System administrative consenters with both survey and administrative data on loan aversion.
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1.
Table 10.4  (continued)
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stronger academic preparation and greater expected earnings are more 
likely to borrow. However, unexpectedly, students who fi nd college 
more diffi cult are also more likely to borrow.
Perhaps most remarkable given current policy efforts, we fi nd no 
statistically signifi cant evidence that fi nancial knowledge is related to 
borrowing behaviors among these low-income students. There is some 
indication that students who perceived themselves as fi nancially com-
petent were more loan averse, but the fi nding is sensitive to how loan 
aversion is measured and cannot be said to differ from zero. Thus, it 
does not appear that increasing the fi nancial education of these students 
would alter their borrowing behavior.
Also contrary to prior studies, we fi nd that in this sample of Pell 
Grant recipients, loan aversion is associated with a longer time horizon. 
The vast majority of students (about 84 percent) reported a willingness 
to sacrifi ce today for tomorrow, and while this did not differ for loan-
averse students, those who were averse to loans were far more likely to 
choose to receive $500 in three years rather than a smaller amount of 
money sooner. It seems these students may forgo the short-term need 
for resources for what they perceive as a better deal in the future (hav-
ing less debt). This is consistent with the fi nding that students with self-
control are also overrepresented among loan-averse students.
Loan aversion appears to be offset by the decision to work dur-
ing college. While not statistically signifi cant, results indicate that stu-
dents who worked in high school are more likely to borrow, while those 
working in college are less likely to borrow.
Finally, there is some evidence that the form of social capital held 
by students relates to their loan aversion. Students who believe they can 
get fi nancial help if they need it are less likely to borrow, as are students 
who got help from someone other than a family member when apply-
ing for college. In other words, they may have additional supports that 
either help them perceive that loans are unnecessary or are inadvisable.
The measure used to defi ne loan aversion generally does not seem to 
affect the description of who is loan averse and who is a borrower, with 
a few exceptions. First, and most importantly, if students are classifi ed 
as loan averse using the survey data, then non-Hispanic white students 
are equally represented among loan takers and nontakers. However, if 
loan aversion is measured with administrative data, non-Hispanic white 
students are substantially overrepresented among loan takers. Also, the 
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degree of loan aversion is much larger among Southeast Asian students 
when measured using administrative records compared to surveys. It is 
also possible that the survey and administrative measures may capture 
somewhat different aspects of loan aversion—for example, students 
may be more likely to decline loans in their fi rst semester of college 
because they can gain support from their families while still expressing 
a desire to avoid taking on additional loans.
While the differences are not statistically signifi cant, the trends 
regarding gender point in opposite directions using different data 
sources. Relying on the survey measure, women are more loan averse 
than men, but relying on the administrative measure, men are more 
averse than women.
The measurement of loan aversion has implications for some of 
these differences. For example, when aversion is assessed using the 
survey measure, it appears that borrowing is unrelated to whether a 
student is non-Hispanic white, has a lower expected family contribu-
tion, the family does not contribute to their education, or the number 
of hours they are working. However, if the administrative data is used 
to measure loan aversion, we fi nd that non-Hispanic white students are 
more likely to borrow, as are students with higher EFCs, while stu-
dents whose families do not support them and who work longer hours 
are more loan averse. The strength of the relationships between student 
characteristics and loan aversion also vary widely according to how 
aversion is measured. 
Institutional Level
Financial aid administrators at the colleges and universities initiate 
the process of borrowing for students, and students’ decisions are made 
in the context of their campus affordability climates (Goldrick-Rab 
and Kendall 2013). For this reason, we next explore how loan-taking 
behaviors varied according to the specifi c college or university students 
attended. Table 10.5 reveals that the percentage of loan-averse students 
varies substantially across these Wisconsin institutions, ranging from 
just 7.8 percent at the most selective institution (University B) to 38.8 
percent at the two-year branch campuses.12 These differences correlate 
with the academic abilities of students (the correlation between ACT 
score and loan aversion is around r = −0.72). But they do not align 
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UW colleges 38.8 18 23 4,566 24 20 8.5 82.0 9.1
Four-year 15.7
Most selective
University A 8.3 23 26 6,266 17 69 2.2 83.9 6.8
University B 7.8 26 30 6,246 12 81 1.4 93.8 12.8
Total 8.0
Somewhat selective
University C 11.9 20 24 6,779 21 51 3.5 75.8 7.4
University D 9.1 20 25 6,225 25 56 4.5 74.0 5.0
University E 16.7 20 24 6,418 22 55 4.2 74.9 5.9
University F 9.8 21 25 6,474 25 61 3.8 78.4 5.8
University G 10.0 20 24 4,657 38 41 9.2 71.6 7.0
University H 10.9 20 24 5,506 20 56 4.5 78.0 9.5
Total 11.1
Least selective
University I 18.7 19 24 8,578 23 43 5.7 73.3 17.0
University J 35.9 18 23 7,940 32 27 10.4 64.3 22.8
Total 24.5
NOTE: All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Selectivity categories are based on retention rates and ACT scores. All institu-
tional characteristics are from the 2008–2009 academic year, except student loan default rates, which are for the FY 2009 cohort. The 
net price listed is for the lowest-income students ($0–$30,000 per year family income). Student loan default rates listed here are over a 
three-year period. Institutions are not named consistent with the WSLS data agreement.
SOURCE: University of Wisconsin System campus aid offi cers (loan offers and acceptances); IPEDS (percent Pell, ACT, grad rate, and 
net price); U.S. Department of Education (default rate); UW System Fact Book (retention rate and percent minority). 
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with the institution’s sticker price and available fi nancial aid—many 
other institutions have similar net prices but different rates of loan aver-
sion. It is also worth noting the range of students rejecting part of their 
loans—this is again most uncommon at selective institutions, but it is 
most common among three of the somewhat selective universities, and 
this is not easily explained by examining the characteristics of those 
institutions.
Focusing on the 10 universities, the highest rates of loan aversion 
are evident at the least selective schools, where students have the lowest 
ACT scores and graduation rates, face the highest net prices and high-
est default rates, and where the proportion of students on campus from 
racial/ethnic minority backgrounds and/or receiving the Pell Grant are 
among the highest. The lowest rates of loan aversion are found at the 
most selective institutions enrolling the smallest fraction of Pell recipi-
ents on their campuses, and where default rates are exceptionally low 
and graduation rates are exceptionally high. This suggests the possi-
bility that either the institutional context in which students make their 
decisions about loans may contribute to their decisions, and/or these 
variations refl ect strong sorting processes of borrowers across schools. 
Again, this merits future investigation.
EXPLAINING LOAN AVERSION
We now examine whether the observed differences in loan aver-
sion discussed above persist when taking multiple differences among 
students into account. We also consider whether the observed demo-
graphic differences in loan aversion can be explained by the hypoth-
esized moderating factors described earlier. Finally, we consider the 
variation in explanatory power of these factors, depending on how loan 
aversion is measured.
Multivariate Analyses
Net of a wide range of individual characteristics and controlling for 
the institution attended, the analysis of loan aversion measured using 
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survey data reveals that black students are far more likely than non-
Hispanic white students to borrow, and second-generation immigrants 
are much more likely than native students to borrow as well (see Table 
10.6). Loan-averse students do not view debt as part of today’s lifestyle 
and are unwilling to borrow to pay for a nicer lifestyle now. At the 
same time, they are also more likely to have been assisted by a college-
educated person when completing the FAFSA, and to feel that they can 
fi nd fi nancial help if they need it in order to avoid having to drop out 
of college. Unexpectedly, students who fi nd college more diffi cult are 
more likely to borrow—and this is after taking into account differences 
in their academic preparation and work behaviors. It may be that stu-
dents who fi nd college more diffi cult are more realistic and/or aware of 
their academic challenges, and thus are borrowing loans to free them-
selves to focus on school.
This same analysis also suggests that black and non-Hispanic 
white students vary in how they view debt (termed “self control” in the 
tables), and once that variation is accounted for, black students are more 
likely than non-Hispanic white students to borrow.13 This relationship 
is strengthened after additional differences in work behavior and social 
capital are leveled. Similarly, second-generation immigrant students 
appear more likely than native students to view college as diffi cult, and 
once that difference is ameliorated, differences in immigrant status in 
loan taking appear more prominent. It is notable that fi rst-generation 
immigrants appear somewhat more loan averse than native students, 
while second-generation immigrants are far less loan averse.
In sharp contrast, the same analyses using administrative data to 
measure loan aversion fail to identify any statistically signifi cant rela-
tionships between these theoretically important factors and loan aver-
sion (see Table 10.7). Using the exact same sample of students but 
measuring aversion as declining a loan offered, none of the observed 
disparities in borrowing behavior (such as those indicated in the admin-
istrative data panel of Table 10.3) persist net of other factors. This may 
be attributable to the much smaller number of students classifi ed as 
loan averse using the administrative measure, which requires students 
to decline loans in a specifi c term (the same term in which the sur-
vey was fi elded). If the estimates were more precise and the observed 
coeffi cients held, we might observe some similar patterns to the survey 
results but with much smaller disparities.
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Table 10.6  Predicting Loan Aversion Using Student Characteristics: Survey Data   
Dependent variable: Declined to accept any money in hypothetical loans     
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.006 −0.004 0.001
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Latino −0.009 −0.020 −0.038 −0.065 −0.077 −0.072
(0.106) (0.103) (0.101) (0.098) (0.095) (0.096)
Hmong (Southeast Asian) 0.097 0.127 0.186 0.098 0.094 0.130
(0.167) (0.175) (0.179) (0.177) (0.180) (0.182)
Native American −0.006 0.029 0.016 0.057 0.064 0.100
(0.148) (0.157) (0.155) (0.154) (0.159) (0.164)
Black −0.137* −0.139* −0.176** −0.176** −0.186** −0.183**
(0.077) (0.082) (0.079) (0.075) (0.076) (0.072)
Parental education < bachelor’s degree −0.085 −0.091 −0.079 −0.077 −0.075 −0.031
(0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065)
First-generation immigrant 0.241 0.244 0.233 0.119 0.133 0.145
(0.167) (0.179) (0.186) (0.178) (0.180) (0.179)
Second-generation immigrant −0.120 −0.147 −0.153 −0.173** −0.169** −0.161*
(0.101) (0.098) (0.093) (0.084) (0.086) (0.085)
English not fi rst language −0.006 0.045 0.021 0.177 0.167 0.164
(0.156) (0.164) (0.160) (0.174) (0.175) (0.176)
Net price ($000s) −0.034 −0.037 −0.038 −0.037 −0.038 −0.037
(0.025) (0.028) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
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Childhood poverty — −0.020 −0.027 −0.034 −0.052 −0.043
— (0.067) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
EFC ($000s) — 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.015
— (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029)
Zero EFC — 0.063 0.079 0.048 0.052 0.060
— (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.078) (0.076)
Financial reciprocity — −0.020 −0.021 −0.046 −0.074 −0.040
— (0.083) (0.08) (0.076) (0.075) (0.078)
Financial obligation to family — 0.047 0.070 0.078 0.076 0.081
— (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
No fi nancial help from family — −0.035 −0.039 −0.044 −0.039 0.001
— (0.058) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.061)
Credit card debt ($000s) — −0.173 −0.148 −0.153 −0.156 −0.160
— (0.153) (0.165) (0.190) (0.189) (0.209)
Extremely likely to complete BA — 0.005 0.001 −0.011 −0.010 −0.036
— (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
ACT score — — 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006
— — (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Strong high school coursework (%) — — −0.109 −0.099 −0.099 −0.106
— — (0.076) (0.077) (0.078) (0.076)
College diffi culty — — −0.150*** −0.157*** −0.155*** −0.158***
— — (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Expected earnings from college (log $) — — −0.050 −0.049 −0.042 −0.038
— — (0.065) (0.068) (0.063) (0.063)
(continued)
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360   Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Financial knowledge (0–15) — — −0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006
— — (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Above avg fi nancial knowledge — — −0.046 −0.071 −0.077 −0.088
— — (0.090) (0.090) (0.092) (0.092)
Perceived fi nancial competence — — 0.062 0.040 0.040 0.039
— — (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050)
Time horizon: $100 in 3 months — — — 0.045 0.040 0.021
— — — (0.085) (0.086) (0.085)
Time horizon: $250 in 1 year — — — −0.077 −0.077 −0.093
— — — (0.072) (0.074) (0.070)
Time horizon: $500 in 3 years — — — 0.069 0.070 0.044
— — — (0.069) (0.070) (0.070)
Willing to sacrifi ce today for tomorrow — — — −0.001 −0.012 0.005
— — — (0.077) (0.080) (0.077)
Generalized debt aversion — — — 0.139 0.138 0.182
— — — (0.125) (0.126) (0.127)
Self-control — — — 0.146*** 0.135** 0.132**
— — — (0.052) (0.053) (0.054)
Internal locus of control — — — −0.030 −0.002 −0.038
— — — (0.183) (0.177) (0.184)
Worked in high school — — — — −0.028 −0.027
— — — — (0.067) (0.069)
Table 10.6  (continued)   
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Currently working — — — — 0.097 0.084
— — — — (0.073) (0.073)
Number of hours currently working — — — — 0.000 0.001
— — — — (0.004) (0.004)
Family helped on FAFSA — — — — — 0.002
— — — — — (0.071)
Other person helped on FAFSA — — — — — −0.114*
— — — — — (0.069)
FAFSA help from college-educated person — — — — — 0.095*
— — — — — (0.052)
Could get fi nancial help if needed — — — — — 0.106*
— — — — — (0.056)
F-value 2.58 2.27 2.40 2.20 2.06 2.01
Sample size 472 472 472 472 472 472
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. A missing data fl ag for childhood poverty is included in the model but not reported (not sig-
nifi cant). The regression also controls for college fi xed effects. All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The coeffi cients are the result of a probit model with marginal effects.
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1.
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Table 10.7  Predicting Loan Aversion Using Student Characteristics: Administrative Data   
Dependent variable: Declined to accept any loans, if offered.      
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.007 0.009 0.006
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Latino 0.007 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.004
(0.018) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.010)
Hmong (Southeast Asian) 0.035 0.077 0.081 0.084 0.083 0.064
(0.052) (0.090) (0.094) (0.096) (0.100) (0.078)
Native American 0.006 0.015 0.020 0.015 0.028 0.014
(0.020) (0.034) (0.037) (0.030) (0.045) (0.026)
Black −0.010 −0.014 −0.014 −0.010 −0.010 −0.007
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Parental education < bachelor’s degree −0.010 −0.011 −0.011 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
First-generation immigrant 0.016 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.013 0.011
(0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.027) (0.021)
Second-generation immigrant −0.000 −0.005 −0.004 −0.007 −0.005 −0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
English not fi rst language 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.003
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011)
Net price ($000s) −0.003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Childhood poverty — −0.007 −0.006 −0.003 −0.006 −0.004
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— (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
EFC ($000s) — −0.007 −0.007 −0.006 −0.006 −0.008
— (0.042) (0.054) (0.051) (0.050) (0.041)
Zero EFC — −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
— (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Financial reciprocity — 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.004
— (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Financial obligation to family — 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
— (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
No fi nancial help from family — 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.007
— (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Credit card debt ($000s) — −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
— (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
Extremely likely to complete BA — 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.008
— (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
ACT score — — 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
— — (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Strong high school coursework (%) — — −0.002 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005
— — (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
College diffi culty — — −0.006 −0.004 −0.005 −0.003
— — (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Expected earnings from college (log $) — — −0.015 −0.012 −0.010 −0.008
— — (0.105) (0.091) (0.085) (0.065)
Financial knowledge (0–15) — — −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.002
(continued)
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— — (0.030) (0.023) (0.030) (0.019)
Above average fi nancial knowledge — — 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.007
— — (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
Perceived fi nancial competence — — 0.002 0.000 0.001 −0.000
— — (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Time horizon: $100 in 3 months — — — 0.004 0.007 0.005
— — — (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
Time horizon: $250 in 1 year — — — 0.021 0.025 0.019
— — — (0.024) (0.027) (0.022)
Time horizon: $500 in 3 years — — — 0.018 0.018 0.013
— — — (0.018) (0.018) (0.014)
Willing to sacrifi ce today for tomorrow — — — 0.007 0.006 0.004
— — — (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Generalized debt aversion — — — −0.002 −0.002 −0.001
— — — (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Self-control — — — 0.003 0.003 0.002
— — — (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Internal locus of control — — — 0.007 0.005 0.004
— — — (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Worked in high school — — — — 0.001 0.002
— — — — (0.005) (0.004)
Table 10.7  (continued)
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Currently working — — — — −0.009 −0.008
— — — — (0.010) (0.009)
Number of hours currently working — — — — 0.001 0.001
— — — — (0.007) (0.005)
Family helped on FAFSA — — — — — 0.003
— — — — — (0.005)
Other person helped on FAFSA — — — — — −0.003
— — — — — (0.005)
FAFSA help from college-educated person — — — — — −0.001
— — — — — (0.004)
Could get fi nancial help if needed — — — — — 0.007
— — — — — (0.008)
F-value 3.33 2.65 2.80 2.46 2.22 2.00
Sample size 472 472 472 472 472 472
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. A missing data fl ag for childhood poverty is included in the model, but not reported (not 
signifi cant). The regression also controls for college fi xed effects. All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The coeffi cients are the result of a probit model with marginal effects. 
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1.
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LOAN AVERSION AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES
There are many mechanisms through which aversion to borrowing 
could affect educational outcomes, which could include both positive 
and negative pathways. For example, loan aversion may mean that stu-
dents work harder and invest more energy in school to fi nish faster. Or it 
may mean that students must attend school part-time in order to afford 
college (Cunningham and Santiago 2008). The most important issue, 
however, is that selection into loan aversion is likely to bias the esti-
mates of impacts. In other words, if loan-averse students are more often 
from families with less overall fi nancial stability, this may overstate the 
negative impact of aversion for educational outcomes. In the present 
analysis we are not able to adequately remove potential biases result-
ing from unobserved characteristics of both students and their schools, 
which correlate both with loan aversion and the chances of college per-
sistence. Thus, our results are best thought of as correlational.
The way in which loan aversion is measured has implications for 
whether or not it is associated with retention to the second year of col-
lege. As Table 10.8 indicates, if aversion is measured using survey data, 
we fi nd that loan-averse students are 10 percentage points more likely to 
persist in college to their second year, whereas using the administrative 
data we observe no relationship whatsoever. But, net of other observ-
able characteristics, borrowers outperform loan-averse students, enroll-
ing for more semesters, earning more credits, and higher grade point 
averages. The results based on the administrative data indicate that bor-
rowers had somewhat weaker outcomes than loan-averse students with 
regard to enrollment each term and earned a slightly lower cumulative 
grade point average (see Table 10.8).
DISCUSSION
Many of our descriptive fi ndings echo those produced by Cunning-
ham and Santiago’s (2008) analysis of the 2003–2004 NPSAS data, 
confi rming racial/ethnic variation in loan aversion, for example.14 This 
sample exhibits less loan aversion overall, probably because the stu-
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Table 10.8  Academic Outcomes by Borrowing 
Administrative data measure Survey measure 
Regressions Regressions
Measure Loan averse Unadjusted Covariate-adjusted Loan averse Unadjusted Covariate-adjusted
Enrollment by term
Spring 2009 95.7 −0.5 −0.2 94.4 3.4** 4.2**
(2.1) (3.1) (1.5) (2.0)
Fall 2009 82.4 0.2 −4.8 78.1 10.5*** 8.9***
(3.9) (3.9) (2.9) (3.1)
Spring 2010 76.2 1.4 −1.8 73.5 9.0*** 6.9**
(4.5) (4.8) (3.4) (3.5)
Fall 2010 70.9 0.2 −3.2 66.9 10.2*** 9.3**
(4.8) (5.8) (3.7) (4.1)
Spring 2011 70.6 −2.5 −8.3 65.4 7.8** 5.1
(4.8) (6.2) (3.8) (4.4)
Credits earned 64.8 2.0 −1.8 63.7 6.3*** 4.6**
(2.9) (3.1) (2.2) (2.1)
On 4-year track 18.3 5.3 2.5 22.8 −0.2 −2.2
(90 credits) (4.2) (5.2) (3.5) (3.8)
Semesters enrolled 4.96 −0.07 −0.18 4.78 0.41*** 0.31**
(0.17) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12)
Cumulative GPA 2.58 −0.05 −0.22*** 2.42 0.26*** 0.23***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Sample size 128 684 678 401 684 678
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Standard errors are in parentheses. OLS is 
used for continuous outcomes, while a probit model with marginal effects is used for binary outcomes. Covariate-adjusted estimates 
include race, gender, parental education, age, EFC, total grants accepted, and campus fi xed effects.  
SOURCE: University of Wisconsin System.       
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dents all received grant aid and attended college full time initially, fac-
tors that the authors found were associated with lower rates of loan 
aversion. However, our data and methods allowed us to dig deeper into 
both the accuracy of the assessment of loan aversion and the meaning 
of it. In particular, the additional examination of variation in borrow-
ing behaviors according to immigration status and language spoken at 
home highlights some additional reasons to attend to variation in bor-
rowing behaviors. The fastest growing segments of the undergraduate 
populations, especially at public two-year colleges, appear more disin-
clined to borrow.
Our analysis is consistent with recent research suggesting that 
declining student loans may not be irrational, but rather refl ect students’ 
and their families’ tastes for commitment and preference for making do 
without debt (Cadena and Keys 2013). Students who borrow may not 
share these preferences or may fi nd them outweighed by other needs, 
and they are more likely to fi nd themselves having diffi culty in college. 
We fi nd complementary evidence from in-depth interviews conducted 
for the same study with a focal sample of 50 WSLS participants inter-
viewed repeatedly over a fi ve-year period. One student refused to bor-
row, putting great emphasis on his selection of a roommate who would 
support his choices to maximize his time spent working, minimize the 
time spent on leisure, live frugally, and focus on school. Another stu-
dent was far less focused, trying to attend to every relationship in her 
life at the same time, prioritizing school, family, boyfriend, and work to 
the detriment of her physical and mental health, which ultimately drove 
her to take on loans shortly before dropping out of school.
Perhaps the greatest lesson from this study, however, is that the 
measurement of loan aversion affects conclusions about which students 
refuse to borrow and why. Most studies of loan aversion rely on student 
surveys, which this chapter suggests may overstate the prevalence of 
antiborrowing attitudes. This could mean that loan aversion is less com-
mon than previously estimated. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that the apparent disconnect between students’ preferences and their 
actions does not reveal an inconsistency but rather points to constrained 
choices. It may be that students are borrowing when they prefer not 
to, which could contribute to negative outcomes of borrowing down 
the road. An increasing debt burden held by individuals who strongly 
preferred not to have debt could also have public policy implications. 
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It is possible that these debt holders will push for a policy solution that 
helps reduce the burden immediately after leaving college. Research by 
Ozymy (2012) suggests that lower-income college students are more 
likely to contact their elected offi cials regarding student loans than 
higher-income students, and self-interest is the likely reason. This could 
result in accelerating the shift in policy toward income-based repay-
ment options from fi xed repayment options.
Limitations
While this study has several strengths, including the use of multiple 
forms of data to measure loan aversion, detailed information on stu-
dents’ attitudes and behaviors, and the ability to connect loan aversion 
to educational outcomes, it also suffers some signifi cant limitations. 
First and most importantly, the sample is constrained to a fraction of 
all Wisconsin Pell recipients, who likely differ in key ways from the 
national population of such students. Second, it is diffi cult to ascertain 
whether observed measurement differences in loan aversion are attrib-
utable to the difference between stated preferences and actual behavior, 
timing, or something else. Third, the analyses are relatively small in 
size, limiting statistical power.
Implications and Future Research
There is a critical question looming large and unanswered in this 
analysis, essential for how readers think about next steps: Is loan aver-
sion a concern? Some will readily answer yes, thinking that deciding 
not to borrow means that students will be worse off in the long run if 
borrowing would have increased their chances of degree completion 
compared to the alternatives. Loan-averse students, in other words, may 
have a reduced risk of being burdened with unmanageable debt, while 
also increasing their chances of college dropout and reducing their 
expected lifetime earnings.
On the other hand, there are additional opportunity costs that accrue 
to some students, including those who are most often loan averse. The 
typical calculation for assessing whether debt is manageable and opti-
mal compared to the returns to college relies on a comparison to a stu-
dent’s future earnings. Debt to future earnings ratios are most often the 
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focus of calculations regarding the appropriateness of loans. However, 
not only do students from low-income families face more constrained 
labor markets and employment discrimination than other students, 
thus lowering their projected future earnings, but they also come from 
families with more existing debt and greater fi nancial need—meaning 
that a portion of their future earnings are often already committed to 
their families, as a form of familial debt (Burton 2007). Thus it may be 
more appropriate to focus on debt to household ratio when assessing the 
rationality of loan aversion, and include a student’s natal family (and 
even extended kin network) in that household calculation.
Today, nearly one in fi ve households has student debt—double the 
share of two decades earlier—with an average balance of more than 
$26,000. While higher education advocates are right to point out that 
college is a good investment, and the price of a new sedan is comparable, 
they miss a critical point: poor families owe 24 percent of their house-
hold income to student debt, compared to 7 percent or less for families 
making more than $60,000 a year (Fry 2012). While the amount of 
debt may be relatively similar across levels of family income, its mean-
ing is quite different. With such a differential impact on poor families, 
loan aversion may be a smart decision. The relevant lack of aversion, in 
other words, could also be viewed as problematic.
In the future, researchers should think about ways to increase the 
precision of how we measure loan-taking decisions (using both sur-
veys and administrative data) so that it becomes possible to intervene 
to facilitate student decisions consistent with their own preferences and 
intentions. It would also be useful to conduct detailed mixed-method 
ethnographic studies of students and low-income families to examine 
how decisions about loan taking affect the degree to which higher edu-
cation helps to increase their social mobility or perpetuates their eco-
nomic struggles.
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Notes
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Great Lakes Higher Education Guaranty 
Corporation, Institute for Research on Poverty, Spencer Foundation, William T. Grant 
Foundation, Wisconsin Center for the Advancement of Postsecondary Education, and 
an anonymous donor provided funding for this study, conducted in partnership with 
the Fund for Wisconsin Scholars, the Higher Educational Aids Board, the University 
of Wisconsin System, and the Wisconsin Technical College System. The authors thank 
Allie Gardner and Kaja Rebane for their help and support. All mistakes reside with 
the authors. Contact the lead author at srab@education.wisc.edu with questions and 
comments.
1. A small fraction of students attend colleges that do not participate in the Title IV 
fi nancial aid program (these are mainly for-profi t institutions), or colleges that 
decline to offer loans (most often community colleges and/or minority serving 
institutions).
2. Estimates vary; one recent study suggests that overall about one in six students at 
public and private four-year colleges and universities declines the entirety of the 
subsidized loans offered to them (Cadena and Keys 2013).
3. While some argue that the relevant ratio is debt-to-postgraduation income, it is 
important to recognize that among low-income families, money is often shared—
that is, children continue to contribute to their families postgraduation and receive 
little fi nancial assistance in return—and students more often reside in areas with 
fewer employment opportunities and lower wages.
4. The latest NPSAS was just released but is unavailable at the time of this writing 
because of the government shutdown.
5. Samples in this chapter are too small to examine differential patterns according to 
loan subsidization.
6. Net price is the difference between the institution’s cost of attendance (the sticker 
price, including tuition, fees, room and board, and all other estimated costs) and 
all grant aid students receive. The net price thus includes the family’s expected 
contribution (offi cially calculated by a federal formula) and all funds they are left 
to earn or borrow to pay for college.
7. The lead author directs the Wisconsin Scholars Longitudinal Study (WSLS), and 
more details about the study can be found at www.fi naidstudy.org and in Goldrick-
Rab et al. (2012). All data included in this analysis were collected over a fi ve-year 
period by the WSLS research team.
8. Interest rates on unsubsidized Stafford Loans have been fi xed at 6.8 percent from 
2006–07 to 2012–13. The interest rate on subsidized Stafford Loans declined from 
6.8 to 6.0 percent for loans issued in 2008–09, 5.6 percent in 2009–10, 4.5 percent 
in 2010–11, and 3.4 percent in 2011–12 and 2012–13. It remains 3.4 percent for 
the 2012–13 academic year. Beginning July 1, 2013, all interest rates are tied to 
the 10-year Treasury note.
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9. Subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford Loans carry different repayment protec-
tions. Today, under Income-Based Repayment, the government will pay the inter-
est for up to three years for borrowers whose incomes are too low to cover interest 
payments on their subsidized loans, but this is not the case for unsubsidized Staf-
ford Loans.
10. We thank Dr. Stephen DesJardins for noting in his published papers that requesting 
loan offers when obtaining fi nancial aid data is essential to exploring fi nancial aid 
packages and their impacts.
11. We also considered defi ning a student as loan averse if s/he declined at least half 
of all of the loans offered. The correlation between the two measures was weaker 
(0.16), which is unsurprising, since the survey measure required rejection of all 
loans offered. We also considered categorizing a student as loan averse if s/he 
declined all unsubsidized loans, since the interest rate in the survey question was 
more consistent with these. The correlation between the survey and administrative 
measures this way was 0.28, suggesting that at least some students thought of the 
survey question as regarding that type of loan. However, we have a much smaller 
sample of those students compared to all students offered any loans, and declining 
subsidized loans is a behavior worth examining, so we focus on that larger sample 
here.
12. Consistent with the WSLS data agreement, universities are not named here.
13. In analyses not shown, we also fi nd that students from three of the poorest areas in 
the state—Milwaukee, Kenosha, and Racine—are more loan averse.
14. Cunningham and Santiago (2008) found more aversion among Chinese and Viet-
namese students, while we identifi ed substantial aversion among Hmong students.
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